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• Payments systems are at the centre of domestic
and international ﬁnancial infrastructure. While
they operate virtually unnoticed, they are
essential to the smooth functioning of a modern
market-based economy such as Canada’s.
• Of particular signiﬁcance are payments systems
thataresystemically important. Thesearesystems
that, because of the size or the type of the
payments they process, could trigger or transmit
serious shocks across domestic or international
ﬁnancial systems or markets if they are
insufﬁciently protected against risk.
• This article reviews an international initiative
that established a set of core principles for the safe
and efﬁcient operation of systemically important
payments systems.
• The article also looks at the role of central banks in
overseeing major payments systems and in
applying the core principles, focusing on the Bank
of Canada’s oversight responsibilities under the
Payment Clearing and Settlement Act.
• Canada’s systemically important payment
system—the Large Value Transfer System—has
been assessed as being in compliance with the core
principles.
ayments systems are at the centre of both the
domestic and international ﬁnancial infra-
structure. They are the means by which
ﬁnancial institutions transfer funds among
themselves on their own behalf or on behalf of their
customers. While they operate virtually unnoticed,
they are essential to the smooth functioning of a mod-
ern market-based economy such as Canada’s because
they transfer monetary value, often in association
with transactions involving goods and services or
ﬁnancial instruments. Canada’s two payments sys-
tems are the Large Value Transfer System (used for
large-value or time-sensitive payments) and the
Automated Clearing and Settlement System (used to
process and settle all other payments—such as paper
cheques and small-value electronic funds transfers).
Of particular signiﬁcance for the ﬁnancial system are
systemically important payments systems—systems
that because of the size or the nature of the payments
they process could trigger or transmit serious shocks
across domestic or international ﬁnancial systems or
markets if they were insufﬁciently protected against
risk. This is often referred to as systemic risk. Poorly
protected systems could be disrupted by the insol-
vency of one participant in the system or by serious
operational problems. Similarly, such systems might
spread, and possibly amplify, difﬁculties elsewhere in
the ﬁnancial sector. Thus, robust payments systems
are critically important to ﬁnancial stability.
Over the past few years, a broad international consen-
sus has emerged on the need to develop sound princi-
ples and practices in areas that are key to promoting
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and maintaining robust ﬁnancial systems.1 One area
in which such principles did not exist was the design
and operation of payments systems. The ﬁnancial dif-
ﬁculties experienced by a number of emerging-market
economies during the 1990s gave added impetus to
work in this area, when serious ﬂaws were revealed in
their ﬁnancial infrastructure, including payments sys-
tems. In addition, the increasing value of payments
associated with the growing volume of ﬁnancial trans-
actions has led many countries to re-examine their
payments systems and to develop plans for signiﬁcant
changes. There has been a particularly strong demand
from emerging-market economies for advice on the
development and implementation of these plans.
Payments systems, especially those
that handle large values, are essential
tothesmoothfunctioningofCanada’s
modern market-based economy.
Central banks, and particularly central banks from the
Group of Ten (G-10) countries, have played a critical
role in both domestic and worldwide initiatives to
improve the safety and efﬁciency of payments sys-
tems.2 In May 1998, the G-10 central banks’ Committee
on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) estab-
lished a task force to develop an overall framework of
core principles for the design, operation, and over-
sight of payments systems in all countries. The princi-
ples were to represent a broad international consensus
but were not intended to impose a single payments-
system model, since it was recognized that economies
and institutional arrangements within countries vary
considerably. To help achieve a broad consensus, the
task force included not only representatives from the
G-10 central banks and the European Central Bank,
but also representatives from 11 other central banks in
countries at different stages of economic and ﬁnancial-
sector development, along with representatives from
1. The development of such principles and practices is a major component of
the concerted international strategy developed by an ad hoc working commit-
tee established in 1997 to foster ﬁnancial stability in countries experiencing
rapid economic growth and undergoing substantial changes in their ﬁnancial
system (Group of Ten 1997).
2. The work of the G-10 central banks in this area is published by the Bank for
International Settlements. See the BIS Web site (www.bis.org) for a complete
listing of these publications.
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank (see the box on page 30 for a full list of task force
participants.)Thetaskforcealsoconsultedextensively
with groups of central banks in Africa, Asia, the
Paciﬁc Rim, Europe, and the Americas.
The ﬁnal report of the task force was published in Jan-
uary 2001 (Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems 2001b). Part 1 of the report outlines 10 core
principles and four central bank responsibilities in
applying those core principles. Part 2 of the report
provides guidance on the interpretation and use of the
core principles. It is addressed to designers, operators,
and overseers of systemically important payments
systems to help them make judgments about the pol-
icy and technical choices they face in building or oper-
ating such systems. It provides examples of how the
principles have been implemented in particular coun-
tries but makes clear that the core principles are not a
blueprint for the design or operation of any individual
system. The diversity of national, social, economic,
and payment infrastructures means that there is no
universal prescription. The core principles are thus
deliberately expressed in general terms so that they
can be useful in all countries, for a long time.
The core principles do not advocate the use of any
particular technology. Indeed, they recognize that
technological change offers many new opportunities
to enhance the safety or increase the efﬁciency of sys-
temically important payments systems. For example,
new technologies are changing the range of possibili-
ties in the areas of security and operational reliability.
Technological developments are also enabling new
payments-system design.
The Core Principles
Systemically important payments systems
The core principles focus on systemically important
payments systems. A payments system is deﬁned as
a system that comprises a set of instruments, proce-
dures, and rules for the transfer of funds among system
participants. Such systems are typically based on an
agreement among the participants in the system and
the system operator, and funds are transferred using
an agreed-upon technical infrastructure.3
3. The core principles may be useful in considering the design and operations
of systems involving the settlement of transfers of other ﬁnancial assets, such
as securities. These systems may, however, raise other ﬁnancial stability con-
cerns in their own right. A separate task force, established by the CPSS and the
International Organization of Securities Commissions, has been examining
the particular issues involved in securities settlement and has recently pub-
lished a consultative report (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
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The core principles establish the key
characteristics that all systemically
important payments systems should
satisfy.
Systemic importance is determined mainly by the
size or nature of the individual payments or by their
aggregate value. Not only systems that transfer
large-value payments may be considered systemically
important, however. Systems that carry predomi-
nantly small-value payments but involve some larger-
value payments might also be judged to be systemically
important. In practice, determining which systems are
systemically important may not be easy, and the
report provides some guidance on identifying such
systems. The core principles are intended for all
systemically important payments systems, whether
they are operated by a central bank or by another
entity. The task force focused on systemically impor-
tant systems because it concluded that the creation of
core principles applicable to all payments systems
regardless of their size or impact on the financial sector
would result in a set of principles that would not be
strong enough to be effective in promoting ﬁnancial
stability.
Public policy objectives for systemically
important payments systems
Reﬂecting the essential contribution of systemically
important payments systems to ﬁnancial stability, the
report states that public policy objectives for these
systems should be their safety and efﬁciency.4 Safety
is a key objective since poorly designed systems could
spread shocks from one participant to another and
could seriously disrupt ﬁnancial markets, imposing
signiﬁcant costs on participants in these markets. But
they must also be efﬁcient for users, since there is little
to be gained from having a very safe system if large-
value payments are processed elsewhere. Individual
system participants have an interest in the safety and
efﬁciency of these systems, and market forces will typ-
ically support these objectives. But these forces may
4. Safety and efﬁciency are not the only public policy objectives for payments
systems. Other objectives such as crime prevention, competition policy, and
consumer protection can play a role in the design of systemically important
payments systems, but these objectives were considered beyond the scope of
the report.
not be sufﬁcient to completely achieve the objectives
of safety and efﬁciency, since not all the risks and costs
associated with the operation of a payments system
are borne by those who create them. System operators
and participants may not have adequate incentives to
minimize the consequences of their own failure or the
failure of another participant. The core principles also
recognize that there may be some trade-off between
achieving safety and efﬁciency, and they encourage
system designers, operators, and overseers to explicitly
recognize these trade-offs in their decision-making.
The core principles and payments-system
risk
The task force identiﬁed various risks associated with
payments systems:
• Credit risk: the risk that a participant in the
system will be unable to fully meet its ﬁnan-
cial obligations within the system when due
or at any time in the future.
• Liquidity risk: the risk that a participant in
the system will have insufﬁcient funds to
meet ﬁnancial obligations within the system
when due, although it may be able to do so
at some time in the future.
• Legal risk: the risk that a poor legal frame-
work or legal uncertainties will cause or
exacerbate credit or liquidity risks.
• Operational risk: the risk that operational
factors such as technical malfunctions or
operational mistakes will cause or exacer-
bate credit or liquidity risks.
These risks can have systemic consequences. That is,
the inability of a system participant to meet its obliga-
tions when due, or a disruption in the system itself,
could result in the inability of other participants or of
ﬁnancial institutions in other parts of the ﬁnancial sys-
tem to meet their obligations when due. Such a failure
could cause widespread liquidity or credit problems,
which could threaten the stability of the ﬁnancial sys-
tem.
The core principles (Box 1) address these risks. The
ﬁrst seven core principles address the management of
various risks in payments systems. The other three
address the efficiency, access, and governance arrange-
ments of payments systems. By far the most inﬂuen-
tial piece of earlier work in the development of the
core principles was the Lamfalussy Report (Group of
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intended for a very speciﬁc type of system (i.e., cross-
border and multicurrency netting arrangements).
They have, however, been adapted and applied
beyond their originally intended scope to a wide
variety of payment and other clearing and settlement
arrangements.5 Six of the 10 core principles of the task
force are based on the Lamfalussy standards, either in
their original form or with some modiﬁcation.6
5.  Indeed, the Bank of Canada adapted the Lamfalussy standards when
establishing the minimum standards that must be met by clearing and settle-
ment systems that are subject to the Bank’s oversight under the Payment
Clearing and Settlement Act.
6. Five of the six Lamfalussy standards addressed risk concerns. These stand-
ards are incorporated in Core Principles I, II, III, V, and VII.
Core Principle I seeks to minimize legal risks. Payments
systems should be legally robust; that is, the rules and
procedures should be enforceable, and their conse-
quences should be predictable. This is especially
important in systems where there are cross-border ele-
ments (such as participation by foreign banks, where
the laws of several jurisdictions may apply). A wide
range of laws may have to be considered, including
general laws related to contracts, securities, banking,
or insolvency, as well as more speciﬁc laws applicable
only to payments systems. In addition, case law, con-
tracts, and rules governing a system’s operations also
need to be considered. This is a very difﬁcult area for
payments systems to address adequately, and consid-
erable resources are likely to be needed to implement
this principle.
I. The system should have a well-founded
legal basis under all relevant jurisdictions.
II. The system’s rules and procedures
should enable participants to have a
clear understanding of the system’s
impact on each of the ﬁnancial risks they
incur through participation in it.
III.  The system should have clearly deﬁned
procedures for the management of credit
risks and liquidity risks, which specify
the respective responsibilities of the sys-
tem operator and the participants and
which provide appropriate incentives to
manage and contain those risks.
*IV.  The system should provide prompt and
final settlement on the day of value,
preferably during the day and at a mini-
mum at the end of the day.
*V.  A system in which multilateral netting
takes place should, at a minimum, be
capable of ensuring the timely comple-
tion of daily settlements in the event of
an inability to settle by the participant
with the largest single settlement
obligation.
VI. Assets used for settlement should prefer-
ably be a claim on the central bank;
where other assets are used, they should
carry little or no credit risk and little or
no liquidity risk.
VII. The system should ensure a high degree
of security and operational reliability
and should have contingency arrange-
ments for timely completion of daily
processing.
VIII. The system should provide a means of
making payments which is practical for
its users and efﬁcient for the economy.
IX. The system should have objective and
publicly disclosed criteria for participa-
tion, which permit fair and open access.
X. The system’s governance arrangements
should be effective, accountable, and
transparent.
* Systems should seek to exceed the minima included in these two core
principles.
Box 1
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Core Principles II and III address the ﬁnancial risks
(credit and liquidity) in a system. The system operator
and the participants should clearly understand the
ﬁnancial risks in the system and who bears them. The
rules and procedures must clearly deﬁne how these
risks are to be managed and how the responsibility for
managing these risks is to be shared between the system
operator and the participants. There must also be suf-
ﬁcient incentives and capabilities for the parties to
manage and contain these risks. The report discusses
various ways in which risks can be addressed, includ-
ing the ongoing monitoring of the risks that partici-
pants may pose to the system, the use of limits on the
amount of exposures created by participants, or the
collateralization or prefunding of payment obliga-
tions. A key element in risk containment is that the
payment-processing and risk-management processes
operate in real time.7
Core Principles IV and VI go beyond the Lamfalussy
standards and require systemically important payments
systems to provide prompt ﬁnal settlement on the day
of value for all payments accepted by the system.8 The
assets used for settlement should carry little or no
credit or liquidity risk. Thus, the preferred asset to use
for settlement purposes is a claim on the central bank
(that is, domestic currency account balances held at
the central bank by the system participants). The
implication of Core Principle VI is that those systems
in which all participants settle directly with each other
using accounts at the central bank provide a greater
degree of safety to the participants. In certain systems,
however, some participants (often known as “indirect
participants”) settle their obligations using accounts
held with “direct participants” that settle directly
using central bank accounts. These indirect partici-
pants may be exposed to greater credit and liquidity
risks than would be the case if they used central bank
accounts. Nevertheless, these so-called tiered arrange-
ments can be significantly more efficient than those
in which all payments-system participants must use
central bank accounts. They allow greater competition
among participants for the business of third parties,
and they can reduce the liquidity and operational
costs for all participants by pooling and netting pay-
ment flows between a direct participant and its indirect
7.  Real-time processing is the processing of payment instructions on an indi-
vidual basis at the time they are received by the system rather than at some
later time, such as at the end of the day.
8.  A payment is accepted by a system once it has passed all the relevant risk-
control tests.
participants. Designers and operators of systemically
important payments systems must carefully consider
the trade-off between safety and efﬁciency in their
own speciﬁc circumstances.
These two principles are intended to reduce the risks
that system participants might face if a system did not
settle the positions among participants in a timely
manner. Core Principle IV carries both a minimum
standard—settlement should occur at the end of the
day of value—and a “best-practice” statement—that
payments should settle during the day, rather than at
the end of the day. Settling payments among partici-
pants as quickly as possible reduces the time that par-
ticipants are exposed to, and must manage, the risks
that they bear. The minimum standard seeks to avoid
having these exposures carried over into the next
business day. The best-practice statement seeks to
have a system that will provide real-time ﬁnal settle-
ment for each payment immediately after it is accepted
by the system. This has already been achieved in
many countries that have recently introduced new
large-value payments systems.
Core Principle V incorporates the fourth, and proba-
bly the most important and inﬂuential Lamfalussy
standard. Unlike the other principles, it addresses
only a speciﬁc type of systemically important pay-
ments system—namely, one that uses multilateral net-
ting,9 which typically involves deferring settlement
until the end of the day. In such systems (and in the
absence of appropriate risk controls), if a participant is
unable to settle its obligations at the end of the day,
the other participants can face unexpected credit and
liquidity risks at the time of settlement, which can be
much larger than the net amounts involved. These
risks can be controlled through measures such as real-
time processing of payments and the use of limits and
collateral, which can be designed so that a netting sys-
tem will be able to settle even if the participant with
the single largest obligation to the system were to fail.
Systems designed in this manner would, however,
meet only the minimum standard. Such systems and
their participants would still be exposed to ﬁnancial
risks if more than one institution were to fail during
the same business day. Thus, this core principle also
contains a best-practice statement—modern, well-
designed multilateral netting systems should be able
to settle even if there are multiple participant defaults.
9.  Multilateral netting refers to arrangements in which three or more parties
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The last risk addressed by the core principles is opera-
tional risk. Core Principle VII requires that a systemi-
cally important payment system should have a high
degree of security and operational reliability appro-
priate to the nature and value of the payment transac-
tions involved. What is appropriate will change over
time as technology and practices evolve and as the
demand for payment services changes. Operational
reliability not only means having reliable and ade-
quately backed-up hardware, software, and network
facilities, but also having effective business proce-
dures as well as trained, competent, and trustworthy
personnel who can operate the system safely and
efﬁciently.
The promotion of efﬁciency in systemically
important payments systems
To address the broad area of efﬁciency, the task force
incorporated the remaining Lamfalussy standard and
added two new principles. Efﬁciency is a particularly
complex issue and raises many difﬁcult conceptual
and measurement issues. Core Principle VIII empha-
sizes the need for a payments system to satisfy the
day-to-day needs of both system participants and
their customers. It is important that system designers
and operators consider how to provide the services
and features demanded by the market, while at the
same time minimizing risks in the system. The report
notes that little would be gained by making a system
so safe that it became too difﬁcult or costly to use,
leading participants and their customers to seek other,
perhaps riskier, ways to make their payments. Thus,
this principle speciﬁcally acknowledges the possible
trade-off between the objectives of limiting the
resource costs incurred in operating a payments sys-
tem and enhancing the system’s safety.
The report recognizes that a system must consider the
structure of the local market, its history, and conven-
tions, and reﬂect the current and prospective costs of
resources needed to design, build, and operate the
system. What works for one country will not necessar-
ily be the best choice for another. Systems should be
designed and operated so that they can adapt to the
development of the markets for payment services
both domestically and internationally, and to new
technologies and procedures. The report suggests an
analytical cost/beneﬁt framework that can be used by
countries in considering efﬁciency issues.
Core Principle IX incorporates another Lamfalussy
standard and extends it to all systemically important
payments systems. It recognizes that access criteria
that facilitate competition among participants will
promote the provision of efﬁcient and low-cost pay-
ment services to end-users. Nevertheless, the beneﬁt
of this competition may have to be weighed against
the need to protect systems and their participants
from the direct participation in the system by institu-
tions that would expose participants to excessive
risks. Any restrictions on access should be explicit,
objective, and based on appropriate risk criteria. They
should also be publicly available. The report states
that criteria restricting access should be assessed in
terms of their justiﬁcation for safety and for efﬁciency.
Consideration should be given to using forms of
risk management that will be the least restrictive
to competition.
Core Principle X addresses the governance arrange-
ments for systemically important payments systems.
Governance arrangements encompass the relation-
ships between the payments system’s management,
its governing body, its owner, and its other stakehold-
ers. Governance is particularly important because of
the nature of the payments that systemically impor-
tant systems handle (large-value and often time-criti-
cal), the signiﬁcant interdependencies created among
system participants, and because of the system’s
potential to affect the economy. Good governance
arrangements will promote conﬁdence in the system
and trust in its operators. Governance arrangements
should be effective (that is, provide sufﬁcient incen-
tives for the system management to pursue objectives
that are in the interests of the system, its participants,
and the public more generally), should provide for
accountability to the owners and to the broader com-
munity served by the system, and should be transpar-
ent, providing all affected parties with access to
information about decisions affecting the system and
how they are taken.
Effective governance arrangements are likely to
include the use of external parties, such as external
auditors, to help provide the system’s management or
governing body with information on the effectiveness
of the system’s internal control system and on the sys-
tem’s operational efﬁciency.
The Role of Central Banks in
Applying the Core Principles
Various public sector agencies may pursue different
aspects of the public policy objectives of safety and
efﬁciency for systemically important payments sys-
tems. Central banks have a key role to play in the
application of the core principles because of their
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stability, their role in providing settlement accounts
for payments-system participants, their ability to cre-
ate liquidity for the ﬁnancial system, and their respon-
sibility for the implementation of monetary policy.
Indeed, in some countries central banks have been
given speciﬁc responsibilities for systemically impor-
tant payments systems. The Bank of Canada, under
the Payment Clearing and Settlement Act (PCSA), is
responsiblefortheoversightofpaymentssystemsthat
could pose systemic risk.10 The task force recognized
this key role for central banks and developed four spe-
ciﬁc responsibilities for central banks in applying the
core principles (Box 2).
Central banks have a key role to play
in the application of the core
principles.
As with the core principles, the development of the
four responsibilities for central banks draws heavily
10.  Oversight focuses on the safety and efﬁciency of a system, as opposed to
the safety and efﬁciency of individual participants or of the ﬁnancial markets
that the system serves. See Goodlet (1997) for a more detailed description of
the PCSA.
on the Lamfalussy Report, which developed princi-
ples for co-operative central bank oversight. The task
force added to these responsibilities and extended
their application to domestic systems.
Whether oversight of payments systems by central
banks is legislatively based or not, designers and
operators of payments systems, as well as participants
and other users, need to have a clear understanding of
the central bank’s role, responsibilities, and objectives
in relation to these systems. Responsibility A requires
a central bank to clearly deﬁne its objectives for a pay-
ments system and to publicly disclose its role and
major policies. This will enable all interested parties to
operate in a predictable environment and to act in a
manner that is consistent with those objectives and
policies. Such disclosure may be part of a legislative
framework, but it will also likely involve the use of
guidelines, other more or less formal publications,
and speeches by senior ofﬁcials. Canada uses all of
these disclosure mechanisms. The PCSA forms the
basis for the Bank of Canada’s oversight. The Bank
has published a guideline indicating how it will carry
out its oversight responsibilities.11 It reports on its
oversight activities in its Annual Report, through
speechesbyseniorofficialsoftheBank,andinpublished
11.  With the publication of the ﬁnal report of the task force (which included
acceptance by the G-10 central bank governors), the Bank is in the process of
modifying its current guideline.
Box 2
Responsibilities of the Central Bank in Applying the Core Principles
A. The central bank should deﬁne clearly its
payment system objectives and should
disclose publicly its role and major poli-
cies with respect to systemically impor-
tant payment systems.
B. The central bank should ensure that the
systems it operates comply with the Core
Principles.
C. The central bank should oversee compli-
ance with the Core Principles by systems
it does not operate and it should have the
ability to carry out this oversight.
D. The central bank, in promoting payment
system safety and efﬁciency through the
Core Principles, should co-operate with
other central banks and with any other
relevant domestic or foreign authorities.26 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2001
papers. The Canada Gazette is used to formally dis-
close the systems that are designated as being sub-
ject to the Bank’s oversight. Finally, the Bank consults
with interested parties regarding its oversight activi-
ties. These efforts are intended to build public support
for, and understanding of, the Bank’s policies and to
help avoid any unintended consequences for the pri-
vate sector or for participants in the payments system.
The task force’s requirement regarding public disclo-
sure was developed in parallel with the IMF’S work
on its Code of Good Practices on Transparency in
Monetary and Financial Policies. The IMF code identi-
ﬁes desirable transparency practices for central banks
and other ﬁnancial agencies in their conduct of pay-
ments-system oversight, among other things. The
code requires agencies with oversight responsibility of
paymentssystems to publicly disclose their role and to
promote the timely public disclosure of general policy
principles that affect the robustness of systemically
important payments systems.
In late 1999, the IMF carried out an assessment of the
Bank of Canada’s compliance with the code in its role
as the oversight agency of systemically important
payments systems. The IMF assessed the Bank’s activi-
ties in four major areas: (i) clarity of roles, responsibil-
ities, and objectives; (ii) open process for formulating
and reporting decisions; (iii) public availability of
information on oversight policies; and (iv) accounta-
bility and assurance of integrity. The IMFconsiders the
Bank’s practices in all of these areas to be fully consist-
ent with the code.12
In many countries, the central bank operates at least
one systemically important payments system. In these
circumstances, the central bank can and should take
whatever actions are necessary to bring about compli-
ance with the core principles (Responsibility B).
In other countries, such as Canada, the central bank is
not the system operator, and the central bank’s
responsibility is to oversee compliance with the core
principles. In these countries, the task force recognized
that some oversight regimes are based on custom and
practice, while other countries have established a stat-
utory basis for central bank oversight by assigning
12. Although its activities in this regard are fully consistent with international
best practices, the Bank plans to enhance its Web site to provide more com-
prehensive information on its oversight activities in a more readily accessible
form. Information will include relevant legislation, descriptions of systemi-
cally important clearing and settlement systems subject to Bank of Canada
oversight and their risk-containment arrangements, and links to other rele-
vant Web sites, as well as the guidelines and relevant speeches and papers
that are already available.
speciﬁc tasks, responsibilities, and powers to the cen-
tral bank. It recommends serious consideration of the
potential beneﬁts of a statute-based approach to over-
sight for countries that are establishing or signiﬁcantly
revising an oversight regime for systemically impor-
tant payments systems. Responsibility C states that
central banks should oversee compliance with the
core principles by systemically important systems that
they do not operate and that they should have the
ability to carry out this oversight. In Canada, the PCSA
deﬁnes which systems are eligible for central bank
oversight, the criteria for determining whether such
systems should be subject to the Bank’s oversight, and
the powers to effectively carry out this oversight. The
Bank’s oversight activities are intended to result in the
reduction or appropriate control of systemic risk.
The report of the task force also notes that central
banks should exercise their responsibilities in the con-
text of the overall ﬁnancial infrastructure in the coun-
try, since there can be signiﬁcant interactions between
any one system and other elements of the ﬁnancial
infrastructure. For example, payments made in the
system may be important for the settlement of obliga-
tions in a securities-settlement system. The PCSA is
again helpful in this regard because it requires the
Bank to exercise oversight not only for systemically
important payments systems, but also for other clear-
ing and settlement systems that could pose systemic
risks (such as a clearing and settlement system for
securities or foreign exchange).
The ﬁnal responsibility (Responsibility D) recognizes
the need for co-operation between the central bank (in
its capacity as overseer or operator) and other authori-
ties. Finance ministries, banking regulators, and com-
petition authorities may also have an interest in this
area. The oversight of payments systems, the surveil-
lance of ﬁnancial markets, and the supervision of
ﬁnancial institutions are complementary activities,
and central banks should co-operate with all relevant
authorities. Central banks should also co-operate with
other central banks and with foreign authorities in
promoting the safety and efﬁciency of systemically
important payments systems, particularly where a
system has cross-border characteristics. The principles
for co-operative central bank oversight in these cir-
cumstances were set out in Part D of the Lamfalussy
Report.
An important mechanism for the Bank of Canada to
facilitate co-operation with other relevant agencies is
the Financial Institutions Supervisory Committee
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at the same time as the consolidation of two federal
supervisory agencies into the Ofﬁce of the Superin-
tendent of Financial Institutions, and is composed
of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (the
chairperson), the Deputy Minister of Finance, the
Chairman of the Canada Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, and the Governor of the Bank of Canada. The
purpose of the FISC is to exchange information and
consult on issues relating to the supervision of ﬁnan-
cial institutions. The Bank uses this forum to discuss
developments related to systemically important clear-
ing and settlement systems with the other agencies. In
addition, under the PCSA, if the Governor judges that
a payments system could pose systemic risk and that
it should be designated under the Act, the Minister of
Finance must be of the opinion that such designation
is in the public interest. This arrangement fosters con-
sultation and co-operation between the Bank and the
Department of Finance in this area.13
The Application of the Core
Principles to Canada’s Large Value
Transfer System
The ﬁrst step in applying the core principles is to
determine which of a country’s payments systems
are systemically important. While all payments sys-
tems are no doubt important to their users, system-
ically important systems are distinguished by their
capability to trigger disruptions or transmit serious
shocks across the financial system domestically or
even internationally.
The Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) is owned and
operated by the Canadian Payments Association. It
processes large-value or time-sensitive electronic
payment messages quickly and continuously through-
out the day, transferring funds among its participants,
either on their own behalf or on behalf of their
customers.14 On a typical day, the LVTS handles about
13,000 payment messages, transferring approximately
$100 billion of value.
In Canada, the Governor of the Bank of Canada,
acting in accordance with the PCSA, has formed the
13.  Proposed ﬁnancial institution legislation (Bill C-8) would result in the
Minister of Finance also assuming some oversight responsibilities for pay-
ments systems. Arrangements are being established between the Department
of Finance and the Bank of Canada to avoid any overlap or duplication of
activities or actions.
14.  For a detailed description of the design and operation of the LVTS, see
Dingle (1998), Freedman and Goodlet (1998), and Goodlet (1997, 1999).
opinion that the LVTS could be operated in a manner
that might pose systemic risk and, consequently, the
LVTS was designated for oversight by the Bank of
Canada. The Minister of Finance was of the opinion
that it was in the public interest to take that action. In
reaching this opinion, the Governor considered fac-
tors such as the large value of individual payments
and the signiﬁcant aggregate value of all payments
handled by the system on a daily basis, the size of
these payments relative to the resources of the sys-
tem’s participants, and the fact that it is used to settle
ﬁnancial transactions from other major clearing and
settlement systems. (For example, the Debt Clearing
Service operated by The Canadian Depository for
Securities Ltd. uses the LVTS to settle payment obliga-
tions with its participants.)
Does the LVTS comply with the core
principles?
Principle I: The system should have a well-founded
legal basis under all relevant jurisdictions.
This principle is probably one of the most difﬁcult to
apply to systemically important payments systems since
it is very difﬁcult to come to deﬁnitive conclusions.
The LVTS is considered to have a well-founded legal
basis. There are well-developed laws in Canada gov-
erning such areas as contracts, insolvency, and anti-
competitive behaviour that have general application
to individuals, institutions, and markets in the econ-
omy. There are also laws that are speciﬁcally applica-
ble to the LVTS. The Canadian Payments Association
(CPA), operator of the LVTS, is a body incorporated by
an Act of Parliament, with the authority to operate
payments systems and to create rules governing the
operation of such systems. The arrangements govern-
ing the relationships among the direct participants in
the LVTS are in the form of bylaws or rules. Once passed
by the Board of Directors of the CPA and approved by
the federal Cabinet, bylaws have the force of law.
The designation of the LVTS under the PCSA reinforces
its legal basis. For example, the PCSA protects the par-
ticipants in the LVTS by preventing creditors of any
failed participants from challenging any of the LVTS
rules or the outcomes arising from the application of
those rules. This contributes to the certainty that the
LVTS will settle in all circumstances as envisioned in
its rules, and this certainty of settlement in turn per-
mits participants to offer their clients intraday irrevo-
cable and unconditional access to funds received via
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Principle II: The system’s rules and procedures
should enable participants to have a clear understanding
of the system’s impact on each of the ﬁnancial risks
they incur through participation in it.
Principle III: The system should have clearly deﬁned
procedures for the management of credit risks and
liquidity risks, which specify the respective responsi-
bilities of the system operator and participants and
which provide appropriate incentives to manage and
contain those risks.
The LVTS bylaw and associated rules created by the
CPA give participants a clear understanding of the
risks they incur by participating in the system. The
system’sdesignandproceduresprovideincentivesfor
the participants to manage and contain these risks. For
example, the system operates in real time with mes-
sage-by-message processing. Each payment message
must pass risk-control tests before being accepted by
the system. Participants can decide whether they wish
to grant intraday credit to other participants or not. If
they grant such credit, they have strong incentives to
manage this exposure carefully because they must col-
lateralize the largest intraday credit position that they
have granted. Participants that do not receive any
intraday credit from other participants can continue to
operate in the system by pledging their own assets.
Collateral to support the use of intraday credit in the
making of payments is pledged directly to the central
bank, ensuring immediate access to liquidity, if neces-
sary. The relevant bylaw and rules cover participant
withdrawal both in normal and abnormal situations
and are available to all interested parties.
Principle IV: The system should provide prompt ﬁnal
settlement on the day of value, preferably during the
day and at a minimum at the end of the day.
Principle V: A system in which multilateral netting
takes place should, at a minimum, be capable of
ensuring the timely completion of daily settlements in
the event of an inability to settle by the participant
with the largest single settlement obligation.
The LVTS provides ﬁnal settlement at the end of the
day—between 18:30 and 20:00—(deﬁned as the time
of debiting and crediting of participants’ accounts at
the Bank of Canada to settle their net positions) and
thus meets the minimum standard. The LVTS also
meets the more demanding best practice (i.e., intraday
settlement) because once a payment message is
accepted by the system (i.e., has passed the risk-con-
trol tests), it is certain to settle (that is, those partici-
pants expecting to receive funds over the system will,
in fact, receive them at the time expected). This cer-
tainty of settlement is possible because, no matter
what else happens, the risk-control arrangements
ensure that net LVTS positions will be settled on the
books of the Bank of Canada. Certainty of settlement
means that funds received over the LVTS are available
to LVTS participants (and their customers) intraday on
an irrevocable and unconditional basis. This is some-
times referred to as intraday receiver ﬁnality.
Bilateral and multilateral limits control the exposures
that any one participant can create in the LVTS. The
single largest exposure created by any one participant
is fully collateralized by the participants. In the
extremely unlikely case of failures of more than one
participant occurring within the same LVTS business
day, the Bank of Canada guarantees that the system
will settle. Collateral pledged by private sector partici-
pants would be used before the Bank of Canada guar-
antee would be invoked.
Principle VI: Assets used for settlement should
preferably be a claim on the central bank; where other
assets are used, they should carry little or no credit
risk and little or no liquidity risk.
The LVTS uses claims on the Bank of Canada to settle
net payment obligations among those participants
that participate directly in the system. The design of
the LVTS ensures that sufﬁcient balances will be avail-
able at the central bank for settlement purposes under
all circumstances.
Principle VII: The system should ensure a high degree
of security and operational reliability and should have
contingency arrangements for timely completion of
daily processing.
The LVTS is a highly secure system. It uses the secure
and reliable SWIFT communication arrangements for
the transmission of payment instructions. Controls
ensure that only authorized users can access the LVTS.
The LVTS has a secondary operation site, in a different
part of the country. Backup processing capacity is
regularly tested. Emergency committees exist to deal
with any operational problems either in the LVTS or
in other systems critical to the functioning of the LVTS
(for example, the Debt Clearing Service, which is used
by LVTS participants to pledge collateral to the Bank
of Canada). Contingency plans are well developed,
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operational risks are examined annually by an inde-
pendent auditing ﬁrm. The Bank of Canada, as over-
sight agency, participates in the latter process. LVTS
operations are administered by experienced CPA man-
agement and staff.
Principle VIII: The system should provide a
means of making payments which is practical for
its users and efﬁcient for the economy.
This principle is difﬁcult to assess. The LVTS was
developed by private sector ﬁnancial institutions
under the auspices of the CPA. It fully addresses the
Bank of Canada’s concerns about systemic risk. The
private sector participants also focused on creating the
least costly arrangement for processing large-value or
time-sensitive payments. The system minimizes the
amount of collateral necessary to support the use of
intraday credit, while delivering real-time processing
of payment messages, certainty of settlement, and
intraday receiver ﬁnality.
There do not appear to be any signs of system inefﬁ-
ciencies. For example, standards exist for payment
messages, messages are processed promptly by the
system, pricing to participants is based on cost recov-
ery, participants can, and do, inﬂuence the hours of
operation and other design issues to meet their needs
and the needs of their customers. Payments are pro-
cessed individually as they are entered into the LVTS;
there have been no cases of payments being queued
for prolonged periods or remaining in queues at the
end of the day and not being processed. The system
has the capacity to handle signiﬁcant growth in pay-
ment volumes.
Principle IX: The system should have objective
and publicly disclosed criteria for participation,
which permit fair and open access.
The criteria for becoming a direct participant in the
LVTS are stated in the LVTS bylaw and allow all CPA
members to become LVTS participants.15 There are no
restrictions related to volume or value of payments
processed by a direct participant.
15.  An LVTS participant must be a CPA member, must have entered into
appropriate deposit, loan, and security agreements with the Bank of Canada,
and must possess the technical proﬁciency to be able to meet its responsibili-
ties as an LVTS participant—that is, be able to operate according to certain
speciﬁed standards (such as SWIFT participation) and have adequate backup
and resources in place to be able to operate in a technically smooth fashion.
CPA members that choose not to be direct participants
in the LVTS can still make payments through the LVTS
on their own account and on behalf of their customers
by using the services of a direct participant.
Restrictions may be placed on the ability of foreign
bank branches to become direct participants in the
LVTS if there are legal concerns arising from the juris-
diction in which the foreign banks are incorporated or
in which they operate.
Foreign banks currently operating in the LVTS do so
through their Canadian subsidiaries. These subsidiar-
ies are incorporated under Canadian law, and they
and their creditors are therefore subject to all Cana-
dian laws including the PCSA. Beginning in 2000, for-
eign banks were able to operate in Canada using
branches. Foreign banks will be eligible to become
direct participants in the LVTS (through their
branches) provided they can satisfy the Bank that their
participation would not jeopardize the operation of
the LVTS measures to control systemic risk (for exam-
ple, the use of netting and collateral). Where such con-
cerns arise, the Governor of the Bank of Canada may
limit the ability of a foreign bank to operate as a direct
participant in the LVTS, or in the extreme, may pre-
vent them from becoming direct participants.
Principle X: The system’s governance arrangements
should be effective, accountable, and transparent.
The LVTS is owned and operated by the CPA. There
are no separate governance arrangements for the
LVTS, although separate committees composed of the
direct participants (including the Bank of Canada)
exist to address various operational and design issues.
The CPA operates under an Act of Parliament, which
speciﬁes membership criteria, the composition of the
board of directors, public-disclosure requirements,
and other requirements. The CPA Board is responsible
for the operation of the LVTS. Plans and objectives are
documented, and progress is assessed. Major decisions
are taken after consultation with interested parties,
and decisions are communicated promptly. The Cabi-
net of the federal government must approve all
bylaws. The Bank of Canada oversees the LVTS for
systemic-risk concerns, and its dealings with the CPA
in this regard are publicly disclosed.
* * *
When assessed against the 10 core principles, the LVTS
is in full compliance and exceeds the minimum
requirements set out in Core Principles IV and V.30 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2001
International Use of the Core
Principles
The task force published two consultative drafts of its
report and consulted widely with many countries at
different stages of economic development from all
parts of the world. The responses to the draft reports
and the consultations have indicated strong and wide-
spread support for the core principles. This strong
consensus makes the core principles a potentially
powerful tool in encouraging the development of
well-risk-proofed payments systems. The report
has been recognized by the Financial Stability
Forum16 as a signiﬁcant contribution to efforts to
strengthen ﬁnancial systems. The core principles were
being widely used to analyze payments systems and
16. The Financial Stability Forum was established by the Group of Seven (G-7)
countries to promote information exchange and to coordinate activities of
national authorities, international institutions, and international regulatory or
expert groups with responsibilities for various aspects of ﬁnancial stability.
Canada is represented by the Department of Finance, the Ofﬁce of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions, and the Bank of Canada.
to guide oversight and reform activities even before
the ﬁnal report was published, and it appears likely
that they will continue to play a key role in contribut-
ing to ﬁnancial stability in the years to come. In this
regard,inlate1999,Canadaparticipatedinapilotproject
administered by the IMF and the World Bank that
involves assessing a country’s compliance with a
number of international standards and codes. This
included an assessment of the LVTS with the core prin-
ciples for systemically important payments systems,
and the IMF concluded that the LVTS is in full compli-
ance. These assessments are part of what is known as
a Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). The
results of the assessment are published in a Report on
the Observance of Standards and Codes and are
available on the IMF Web site (www.imf.org). The
assessments are typically made by experts from other
countries who are members of a team led by the IMF.
The Bank of Canada has participated in the assess-
ment of other countries’ payments systems as part of
IMF missions.
Members of the Task Force on Payment System Principles and Practices
Chairman: John Trundle (Bank of England)
Reserve Bank of Australia
National Bank of Belgium





Hong Kong Monetary Authority
National Bank of Hungary
Bank of Italy
Bank of Japan
Bank of Negara Malaysia
Bank of Mexico
Netherlands Bank
Central Bank of the Russian Federation
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
Monetary Authority of Singapore




Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Central Bank of West Africa States
International Monetary Fund
World Bank
Bank for International Settlements (Secretariat)31 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2001
Literature Cited
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems.
2001a. Recommendations for Securities Settlement
Systems, Report No. 42. Basel: Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements.
———. 2001b. Core Principles for Systemically Important
Payment Systems, Report No. 43. Basel: Bank for
International Settlements.
Dingle, J. 1998. “The LVTS—Canada’s large-value
transfer system.” Bank of Canada Review (Autumn):
39–55.
Freedman, C. and C. Goodlet. 1998. “The Canadian
Payments System: Recent Developments in Struc-
ture and Regulation.” In Payments Systems in the
Global Economy: Risks and Opportunities, 34th
Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Com-
petition. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May.
Goodlet, C. 1997. “Clearing and settlement systems
and the Bank of Canada.” Bank of Canada Review
(Autumn): 49–64.
Goodlet, C. 1999. “Introduction of LVTS in Canada.”
In “Current Topics in Payment and Settlement
Systems.” Paper presented at CPSS Asian-Paciﬁc
Workshop, Hong Kong. Bank for International
Settlements, December.
Group of Ten. 1990. Report of the Committee on Interbank
Netting Schemes of the Central Banks of the Group of
Ten Countries (“the Lamfalussy Report”). Basel:
Bank for International Settlements.
———. 1997. Financial Stability in Emerging Market
Economies. Basel: Bank for International Settle-
ments.
Note: All of the above BIS publications are available
on the BIS Web site at < http://www.bis.org >